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Abstract This paper analyses the effectiveness of the corporate income tax as an
automatic stabilizer. It employs a unique firm-level data set of German manufactur-
ers combining financial statements with firm-specific information about credit market
restrictions. The results show that approximately 20 per cent of all firms report both
positive taxable income and capital market restrictions. Taking account of the in-
come tax rates and the size differences of the firms, we find that demand stabilization
through the corporate income tax amounts to about 8 per cent of an initial shock to
gross revenues. This stabilization effect varies over the business cycle and tends to
increase during cyclical downturns.
Keywords Corporate income tax · Stabilization · Capital market restrictions · Loss
offset · Firm-level data
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1 Introduction
The current economic crisis has given rise to a debate on the role of fiscal policy
as a factor stabilizing demand and, ultimately, employment and output. There are
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essentially two ways in which fiscal policy can contribute to demand stabilization:
firstly, governments may cut taxes or increase expenditure; secondly, governments
may rely on automatic stabilizers. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) define automatic
stabilizers as “those elements of fiscal policy that tend to mitigate output fluctuations
without any explicit government action” (ibid., p. 37).
This paper analyses the effectiveness of the corporate income tax as an automatic
stabilizer. Usually, the debate about automatic stabilizers focuses on the personal in-
come tax. This is because the personal income tax is more important in terms of the
tax revenue it generates and because it is progressive. We focus on the corporate in-
come tax for a number of reasons. Firstly, the base of the corporate income tax is
smaller than that of the personal income tax, but its volatility over the business cy-
cle is much higher. Its potential contribution to overall automatic stabilization may
therefore be more significant than its share in tax revenue suggests. Secondly, the
automatic stabilization properties of the corporate income tax raise some policy is-
sues, in particular the role of intertemporal loss offset, which are less pressing in the
context of the personal income tax. Thirdly, the role of the corporate income tax for
automatic stabilization has been largely neglected in the literature.
How do automatic stabilizers work in the case of the corporate income tax? To
make things simple, consider an economy with a proportional corporate income tax
with a rate of 30 per cent. The effectiveness of this tax as an automatic stabilizer
depends on two factors. The first factor is how a given shock on the firm’s before-tax
profits affects after-tax profits. In our example, a decline in gross profits by 100 Euros
leads to a decline in net profits by 70 Euros. This implies that the corporate income tax
absorbs 30 per cent of the initial shock to gross income. The second factor is the link
between current disposable profit or cash flow and the firm’s demand for goods and
services. Usually, decisions on current expenditures for investment goods and other
inputs will be determined by capital costs and expectations about the profitability
of investment, rather than current cash flow, which depends on the results of past
investment. But firms may also lack financial reserves and face borrowing constraints.
In this case, a cushioning of shocks to current cash flow may stabilize not just after-
tax profits but also demand.
With few exceptions, the literature on automatic stabilizers focuses either on
the personal income tax, social insurance contributions and benefits (see e.g. Auer-
bach and Feenberg 2000; Auerbach 2009; Mabbett and Schelkle 2007; Dolls et
al. 2009), or on the tax system as an aggregate (Sachs and Sala-i-Martin 1992;
Bayoumi and Masson 1995), so that the specific issue of corporate taxation plays
no role. The role of the corporate income tax as an automatic stabilizer is discussed
in Devereux and Fuest (2009).1 They suggest a simple method to measure the au-
tomatic stabilization effect of the corporate income tax, building on the concept of
normalized tax change introduced by Pechman (1973). Applying this approach to
data for UK firms, Devereux and Fuest (2009) find that the corporate tax is largely
ineffective as an automatic stabilizer. On average, the demand stabilization through
the corporate income tax in the UK is equal to only 1 per cent of the initial shock to
1Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) also discuss the role of the corporate tax as an automatic stabilizer but do
not produce any estimates. Their focus is on the U.S. federal income tax.
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gross income. In the presence of full loss offset, the stabilization effect would have
been equal to 8.5 per cent.
The present paper extends the literature as follows. It is an important limitation
of the analysis in Devereux and Fuest (2009) that firm-specific information on credit
constraints and profit or loss positions comes from two separate and unconnected data
sources. The share of firms with both credit constraints and positive taxable income
is, therefore, approximated by assuming that all firms with losses also face credit
constraints. As a consequence, stabilization effects could only emerge if the number
of credit-constrained firms exceeds that of loss making firms. This approach underes-
timates the stabilization effects of the corporate tax as soon as there are firms which
run tax losses but do not face credit constraints. In addition, size differences across
firms cannot be taken into account. Our analysis is based on a new data set of German
manufacturing firms which combines firm-specific information on capital market re-
strictions with financial information about the firms. This allows us to provide a much
more detailed picture of the prevalence of tax losses and financing constraints among
firms. Thus, we are able to provide more precise estimates on the effectiveness of the
corporate tax to act as an automatic stabilizer.
Our analysis leads to the following results. Most importantly, we find that, in
the period 2003–2007, where detailed data are available, biannually, approximately
20 per cent of all firms report both positive taxable income and credit constraints.
Given the German corporate income tax rate of approximately 38 per cent, and
taking account of the size differences of the firms, we find that demand stabiliza-
tion through the corporate income tax amounts to about 8 per cent of the initial
shock to gross revenues. Yet a binary regression analysis reveals that the firms re-
porting credit constraints and positive profits differ from other firms. Most impor-
tant are size differences, which are taken into account using weights for firm size.
We also find that firms that are likely to enjoy stabilization through the corpora-
tion tax tend to show more volatile sales. While this might indicate that the degree
of stabilization is larger, the firms also tend to report a bad business situation. This
casts doubt on the view that they would indeed use all available funds for invest-
ment.
Another important result of our analysis is that the stabilization effect changes
systematically over the business cycle. Since the share of firms with positive taxable
income is procyclical whereas the share of firms with credit constraints is anticycli-
cal, it is unclear, a priori, whether the stabilization effect is pro- or anticyclical. In
our data set, it turns out that the change in credit constraints over the cycle dom-
inates: Our sample starts in 2003, when Germany was in the middle of a severe
economic downturn. For June 2003, our stabilization measure is equal to approxi-
mately 13 per cent. In the following periods, Germany experienced an upswing, and
the stabilization measure declines continuously to reach a value below 3 per cent in
August 2007.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss the key fac-
tors which determine the automatic stabilization effect of the corporate income tax
and we derive the measure of automatic stabilization used in the empirical analy-
sis. Section 3 provides the empirical analysis. Section 4 summarizes the results and
concludes.
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2 Firms and automatic stabilization effects of the corporate income tax
Consider a firm without capital market restrictions. Ignoring risk, this firm would
invest in the capital stock if the expected return on capital investment exceeds that
of an alternative investment, say government bonds. Under standard assumptions,
this decision is not affected by the return on past investment. Hence, a shock to the
firm’s revenues would not affect the investment of the firm. A firm, however, that
is facing capital market restrictions is likely to respond to a revenue shock. As this
firm would use internal funds to finance its investment, partly or fully, a shock to
current revenues translates into changes in the investment decision. For this firm, a
cushioning of revenue shocks due to the corporate income tax is important and will
help to smooth investment spending.
If the firm that experiences an adverse revenue shock still makes profits, it benefits
from a decline of tax payments in proportion to the statutory tax rate. However, if
the firm makes losses, the degree to which revenue shocks to firms are cushioned
through corporate income taxation depends on the treatment of losses (Auerbach and
Feenberg 2000; Devereux and Fuest 2009). In an ideal case, where all losses can be
carried back to some previous periods with positive profits, cushioning of revenues
is symmetric. A loss making firm facing a decline in earnings would benefit from
a reimbursement of previous tax payments in the same proportion as a firm with
positive profits would benefit from a decline in tax payments. However, in the more
realistic case, where loss carrybacks are restricted, the corporate income tax does
not exert much, perhaps no cushioning of revenue shocks to a firm that incurs tax
losses. This suggests that the existence of positive taxable profits constitutes a second
qualification to a stabilizing role of the corporation tax.
How can the cushioning effect of the tax system be measured? In this paper, we
use a simple measure of the cushioning effect, building on Auerbach and Feenberg
(2000) and Devereux and Fuest (2009). Consider an economy with n firms. The cash
flow of firm i in period t is given by
CFit = Rit − Cft − Tt (Rit ,Dit , .), (1)
where Rit denotes the firm’s revenue net of variable costs in period t , Cft denotes
fixed costs, Dit denotes deductions from the tax base related to fixed costs like e.g.
interest on debt or depreciation of capital goods, and Tt (.) is the firm’s current corpo-
rate income tax payment. Note that the firm’s income tax payment may depend on a
number of variables, including taxable profits of past periods. Assume that there is a
shock on Ri , denoted by dRi . The effect on the firm’s cash flow is given by
dCFit = dRit
(
1 − ∂Tt (Rit ,Dit , .)
∂Rit
)
. (2)
Equation (2) shows that the impact of an exogenous revenue shock dRti on the firm’s
cash flow is mitigated by the tax system if current tax payments change as a result
of the decline in revenue and, hence, taxable profits. Of course, current tax payments
of firms not only depend on current revenues but usually also depend on past tax-
able profits and other predictors of current profits, depending on the rules for tax
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prepayments. In addition, firms may be profitable but pay no taxes because of loss
carryforwards from earlier periods. As a first approximation, the analysis below as-
sumes that ∂Tt (Rit ,Dit ,.)
∂Rit
is equal to the statutory corporate income tax rate, denoted
by τt , if taxable profits are positive and equal to zero for loss making firms.2 The
stabilizing effect of the corporate income tax system on the cash flow of all firms in
the economy in period t (ACFt ) can be defined as the difference between the cash
flow effect which would occur in the absence of taxes and the cash flow effect in the
presence of taxes, divided by the overall revenue shock:
ACFt ≡
∑nt
i=1 dRit −
∑nt
i=1 dCFit∑nt
i=1 dRit
. (3)
As pointed out above, the stabilization of cash flows does not necessarily lead to a
stabilization of investment demand. This can only be expected for credit-constrained
firms. Among these firms, only firms with positive taxable profits will be affected by
automatic stabilizers. Denote the number of firms with both credit constraints and
positive profits in period t by mt < nt , and order firms such that these firms have
lower index values j . The aggregate effect of automatic stabilizers on investment
demand can then be written as
ADt ≡
τt
∑mt
j=1 dRjt∑nt
i=1 dRit
. (4)
If the shocks which hit profitable credit-constrained firms and other firms are, on
average, of equal size, i.e. if
1
mt
mt∑
j=1
dRjt = 1
nt
nt∑
i=1
dRit , (5)
the demand cushioning effect can be written as
ADt = τt
mt
nt
. (6)
In the following, we will use data for German firms to measure the stabilizing ef-
fect of the corporate income tax for the case of Germany, using ADt as a measure
of demand stabilization. One should note that this approach is based on the assump-
tion that credit-constrained firms do invest more if their cash flow increases. In our
empirical analysis, however, firms will be classified as credit-constrained if they re-
port difficulties in their access to credit. It cannot be precluded that firms report these
difficulties although they have no intentions to invest, possibly because of bad busi-
ness prospects. In this case, our approach would again overestimate the automatic
2The fact that we do not observe loss carryforwards in the analysis below biases our results towards
overestimating the stabilization effects. One may note, however, that the tax laws of many countries limit
the extent to which loss carryforwards may be set against current profits.
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stabilization effect of the corporate tax. We will return to this issue in the empirical
analysis.
Another limitation of our approach is that there could be indirect effects which
are relevant for automatic stabilizers, to the extent that corporate taxes may influence
the consumption demand of the owners of corporate shares, either through the size of
dividends or through changes in the value of shares, which may trigger wealth effects
on consumption demand. Exploring these effects is beyond the scope of this paper,
though.3
3 Empirical application
What arises from the considerations in the preceding section is that the potentially
stabilizing role of the corporation tax varies with the share of firms that are subject
to capital market restrictions and, at the same time, profitable in the sense that their
taxable income is positive. Now, this latter share is likely to change over the business
cycle. Actually, it proves anticyclical. This can be seen from Fig. 1 which plots a
credit constraint indicator for the German economy4 against a business climate indi-
cator and a degree of capacity utilization (all taken from the Ifo Business Survey).
To provide empirical evidence we take resort to a unique data set for German
firms that combines firm-specific information about business situation, capacity uti-
lization, and capital market restrictions with financial information about these firms—
including profit and loss statements. The data are supplied by the Economics and
Fig. 1 Credit constraint
indicator vs. business cycle
3One may note, though, that households owning shares in companies are less unlikely to be liquidity-
constrained than other households, so that their consumption demand probably responds little to fluctua-
tions in dividends or share values.
4Until 2007 twice a year, the Ifo Business Survey asks firms about their assessments of bank lending
policies. The firms are asked to respond to the following question: “How would you assess the current
willingness of banks to extend credit to business?” The credit constraint indicator is calculated from the
percentage of the responses in the category “restrictive” (alternative categories are “accommodating” and
“normal”).
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Fig. 2 Credit constraint
indicator vs. share of restricted
firms in EBDC database
Business Data Centre (EBDC) in Munich.5 For the purpose of the current analysis
we focus on ten waves of the data where information about capital market restric-
tions is provided, starting with June 2003 until August 2007.
Since the EBDC data used in the study are a subset of the Ifo Business Survey
where financial information from the Amadeus database has been merged, we might
be worried about whether this subsample is representative of the Ifo Business Survey
used in Fig. 1. Figure 2 plots the Ifo Credit Constraint Indicator for the manufacturing
industry against the share of the firms in our data that consider bank lending policies
as restrictive.6 The figure shows that the EBDC data on credit constraints provide a
reasonably good approximation of the general trend in the Ifo Business Survey.7
Empirical evidence on the importance of losses is provided by Fig. 3. It includes
not only the share of firms reporting capital market restrictions but also the share of
firms that experience losses. The share of firms reporting capital market restrictions
is generally twice as large as the share of firms with tax losses (note that the share of
firms with losses is reported on the vertical axis on the right-hand side). Remarkably,
this relationship proves rather robust across the different time periods.
The descriptive statistics presented so far suggest that the stabilizing effect is sub-
ject to different cyclical effects. On the one hand, the share of firms where (net-)
revenues are exerting an impact on investment due to capital market restrictions is an-
ticyclical. On the other hand, the share of firms where net-revenues could potentially
be smoothed by the corporate income tax due to positive taxable profits is procycli-
cal. Thus, the question arises whether, due to the lack of loss offset, the stabilizing
5A data description is available at: http://www.cesifo-group.de/link/_EBDC_database.
6Following the practice of the Ifo Credit Constraint Indicator, a firm is considered credit-constrained in
our analysis if the appraisal of bank lending policies is “restrictive” rather than “accommodating” and
“normal”.
7While rather new, the Ifo Business Survey’s information on credit constraints is widely used to assess
capital market restrictions in Germany (e.g., Bundesbank 2008). A recent micro-level study exploiting
the Ifo Business Survey’s question on credit constraints (von Kalckreuth 2008) finds a significant associ-
ation with firm-level investment policies similar to results based on the Industrial Trends Survey by the
Confederation of British Industry (von Kalckreuth 2006).
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Fig. 3 Share of restricted firms
vs. share of firms with losses
Fig. 4 Share of restricted firms
with positive profits
effect of the corporation tax is rather weak in downturns when it would be most im-
portant.
Evidence is provided in Fig. 4 which shows the share of firms that are reporting
capital market restrictions but still report positive profits (in the above notation, the
figure depicts mt
nt
). This group of firms will not only adjust their investment expendi-
tures to the availability of internal funds. They are also in the position to benefit from
a stabilization of revenues due to the corporation tax. As it turns out, this group of
firms on average makes up a fifth of all firms (axis is on the left-hand side), indicating
that the stabilizing role of the corporation tax is much smaller than indicated by the
share of restricted firms.
To sum up, with regard to the role of taxes as automatic stabilizers, our results
suggest that over the ten waves of the Ifo Business Survey that provide information
about capital market restrictions, the corporate income tax acted as a stabilizer of
investment in a fifth of the German firms, on average. This share, however, is higher
in the beginning of the time period, when the economy suffered from a low degree of
capacity utilization and when the business conditions were rather weak. Later, when
the business situation improved, the share is much lower.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
aPanel comprises 10 waves and
3291 (a : 2968) observations.
Business climate captures the
current business situation and
varies between 1 = good and
3 = bad. Firm size reports
employment in ranges
(1 = 0–49, 2 = 50–199,
3 = 200–499, 4 = 500–999,
5 = 1000 and more)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Restricted firm with positive profits .240 .427 0 1
Business climate 1.96 .671 1 3
Firm size 2.82 1.21 1 5
Publicly traded company .068 .252 0 1
Firm age 43.8 36.34 1 107
Tangibility .285 .198 0 .938
Std. dev. of (log) salesa .121 .183 0 2.15
The role of the corporate income tax needs to be further qualified, however, since
it seems likely that the firms where a smoothing of investment might take place are
special. For instance, these firms might be small or struggling from bad business
perspectives. In the former case, demand effects would be unimportant; in the latter
case, firms would have reason to cut down on investment spending, anyway.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the firms included in the above analysis.
Besides the indicator of whether a firm jointly reports capital market restrictions and
positive profits, the table provides statistics on the business climate and firm charac-
teristics possibly associated with the capital market restrictions faced by the individ-
ual firm. Firm characteristics include variables such as the firm size, the age of the
firm, and the share of tangible capital, all of which should be positively associated
with capital market restrictions. Finally, as firms with higher income volatility might
also face more severe restrictions, we include the standard deviation of each firm’s
sales.
Table 2 shows results for a simple binary regression testing whether specific firm
characteristics have significant effects on the probability to jointly report capital mar-
ket restrictions and positive profits. While we include dummies for the different waves
in order to depict the time pattern noticed above, we find that the firm size and the age
of the firm show significant negative effects. This is in accordance with standard re-
sults in the literature on credit rationing. Also publicly quoted firms depict an inverse
effect. However, tangibility does not prove significant. The appraisal of the current
business situation by the firm shows a positive effect indicating that firms with a
bad business situation are over-represented among the group of restricted firms with
positive profits. Column (2) reports results from a specification which includes the
standard deviation of (log) sales. While all other results are unchanged, qualitatively,
we find that firms with larger volatility of earnings are more likely to benefit from a
smoothing effect of the corporation tax.
In both specifications the firm’s size in terms of employment shows the strongest
effect. This suggests that for an assessment of the role of the corporation tax as an
automatic stabilizer we should take resort to statistics weighted by firm size in order
to assess the importance of firms that are restricted in terms of credit but report posi-
tive profits. Figure 5 documents that the share of these firms weighted by firm size is
somewhat lower indeed.8
8Note that weighting by assets would yield similar results.
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Table 2 Characteristics of
restricted firms with positive
profits
Dependent variable: Binary
variable indicating whether a
firm reports credit restrictions as
well as positive profits. Linear
regressions. An asterisk denotes
significance at 5% level.
Column (1) uses 3291,
column (2) 2968 observations.
All estimates include a full set
of dummy-variables for each
wave of the survey
(1) (2)
Business climate .029  .031 
(.011) (.012)
Firm size −.037  −.034 
(.006) (.006)
Publicly traded company −.063  −.080 
(.025) (.024)
Firm age −.0006  −.0006 
(.0002) (.0002)
Tangibility −.030 −.004
(.037) (.039)
Std. dev. of (log) sales .126 
(.046)
R-squared .069 .070
Fig. 5 Weighted share of
restricted firms with positive
profits
Based on the firm-level data, Fig. 6 reports an aggregate measure of stabilization
corresponding to (6). This measure is obtained as a weighted sum of the statutory
tax rates for all firms where a positive profit as well as credit constraints are reported
and zero for all other firms.9 As can be seen from the figure, the average measure of
stabilization is about 7.8%. For comparison, in the hypothetical case with complete
loss-offset opportunities where all restricted firms benefit from a stabilization of net-
revenues, the average measure would be higher: according to our estimates the mean
figure would be about 11.5%.
The figure also shows that the stabilizing effect of corporate income taxation
changes systematically over the business cycle. In June 2003, when Germany was
9Note that we compute the firm-specific tax rates taking account not only of the corporation tax and the
solidarity surcharge but also of the local business tax rate faced by each firm.
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Fig. 6 Measure of stabilization
in a downturn, the stabilization measure is equal to approximately 13 per cent. In the
following periods, Germany experienced an upswing, and the stabilization measure
declined continuously and reached a value below 3 per cent for August 2007. This
result can be interpreted as follows. As mentioned above, there are two countervail-
ing effects of the business cycle on our measure of automatic stabilization: On the
one hand, the role of credit constraints suggests that automatic stabilizers will tend to
be stronger in downturns because more firms will be credit-constrained. On the other
hand, in economic downturns there will be more firms with losses. These firms do not
pay corporate income taxes, so that automatic stabilization will be weaker. Our results
suggest that the impact of the first factor—the role of credit constraints—dominates
the second.
4 Conclusions
Using ten waves of a survey of German manufacturing firms, we find that, on aver-
age, about 20 per cent of all firms reported both positive taxable income and the ex-
istence of credit constraints. Accordingly, at tax rates of approximately 38 per cent,
and taking account of the size differences of the firms, demand stabilization through
corporate income taxation would amount to about 8 per cent of the initial shock to
gross revenues.
While the data used in the above analysis offer a unique combination of firm-
specific information about credit market restrictions and financial statements, the
empirical magnitude is subject to uncertainties. The micro-level evidence rests on
financial statement and survey data that capture the conditions faced by the firm only
by approximation. The financial statements might differ from the tax accounts and
also do not provide information about the existence of tax shields such as loss car-
ryforwards. Also, the survey data on credit constraints should be considered with
caution, since the distinction of the different response categories might be somewhat
fuzzy.
Besides measurement issues, it should be noted that the firms where the corpo-
rate tax tends to stabilize income may constitute a not-representative group of firms.
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Indeed, our analysis reveals that the firms reporting credit constraints and positive
profits are smaller than the average. We, therefore, weight the data with firm-size in
order to calculate the above aggregate measure of the stabilization effect. However,
even firms with the same size may differ in their exposure as well as in their likely
response to revenue shocks. Since firms, where the corporation tax tends to stabilize
income, show a higher volatility of sales, the stabilization effect might be stronger.
However, these firms are also more likely to report a bad situation for their current
business and, hence, the willingness to invest might be low. Therefore, it seems diffi-
cult to argue that the true amount of stabilization is much bigger—our estimate, thus,
serves as an upper bound. We should also note that our analysis abstracts from the
possibility that at least multinational firms may react to a stabilization of their cash
flow through domestic taxes by smoothing investment in another country.
Our results suggest that the stabilizing effect of corporate income taxation changes
systematically over the business cycle. While stabilization effects are mainly ex-
pected to occur for firms with positive taxable incomes that are also facing credit
constraints, our data suggest that the likelihood to report positive taxable income
may be procyclical whereas the likelihood of credit constraints is anticyclical. In our
data set, it turns out that the change in credit constraints over the cycle dominates
such that the effectiveness of the corporate tax as an automatic stabilizer tends to
increase during cyclical downturns—the stabilization measure increases up to 13%.
Of course, due to the rather short time period considered, more research is needed to
substantiate this finding.
Can we expect our results, which have been derived with German data, to apply
to other countries as well? Most European countries have lower statutory corporate
tax rates, so that the potential for stabilization effects is lower. But it might be the
case that other countries, in particular countries with lower GDP per capita and less
developed capital markets, exhibit a larger share of credit-constrained firms. This
would suggest a stronger effect on demand stabilization.
What are the policy implications of the analysis in this paper? One immediate
implication is that there may be yet another cost of the downward trend in corpo-
rate income tax rates induced by international tax competition: automatic stabilizers
are weakened. Moreover, our analysis highlights a cost of crowding back loss offset
provisions, in particular loss carryback possibilities: restricting loss offset reduces
the automatic stabilization effects of the tax system. Of course, extending loss off-
set would come at a cost in terms of revenue raised, and the question is whether
the benefits in terms of automatic stabilization properties of the tax system justify
this. The benefits of automatic stabilization through the corporate tax system depend
on a number of factors. One issue is whether demand stabilization, if it works, also
stabilizes domestic output. If firms import investment goods or intermediate inputs,
part of the demand stabilization achieved by automatic stabilizers will leak to other
countries. In addition, as pointed out by Blanchard (2000), it cannot be excluded that
automatic stabilizers destabilize output in the presence of certain types of macro-
economic shocks because they delay unavoidable adjustments. These are interesting
issues for future research.
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